RSA

and Number Theory

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What is public key cryptography? Why is there a need?

- Asymmetric vs. Symmetric
- Problems solved by public key
 - Shared secret not needed
 - Authentication
- Trapdoor one-way function
 - Factoring integers
 - Discrete logs
- Slow, power hungry

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Public Key Cryptographic Use

- Secure RPC
- SSL
- Cisco encrypting routers

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Public Key Cryptosystem Security

- · can never provide unconditional security
- Try all possible plaintexts since public key is known
- When you mach with the ciphertext > corresponding plaintext is known

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Where did public key cryptography come from?


- Diffie and Hellman
 - Credited with invention (circa 1976)
 - One year later, RSA is invented
 - April 2002, ACM communications
- 1973 James Ellis (British Gov't)
 - "The possibility of non-secret encryption"
 - NSA claims

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Key distribution

- Alice and Bob need to talk
- Insecure channel of communication
- First, set up our field that our numbers will operate within:
 - p, a large prime (sets up something called our field)
 - $\,\alpha$ is called a primitive root of Fp

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What does the adversary know, and what can he do?

- Knows α^a , α^b , α , and p
- So we want to find the key, k
 - $k = \alpha^{ab}$
 - This is believed to be hard.
- If one knows how to compute discrete logs efficiently, then one can break this scheme (and other schemes based on public key cryptography)

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trapdoor one-way function

- · one-way function
 - easy to compute but hard to invert
 - Example:
 - *Given*: $31 = 2^b \mod 127$, *Find b*?? (DL problem)
- trapdoor function
 - Is one-way function but easy to invert with extra secret knowledge or private info (knowledge of a certain trapdoor)

Overview

- RSA
 - Rivest, Shamir, Adleman, 1977
- Z
 - Modular operations (the expensive part)
 - A sender looks up the public key of the receiver, and encrypts the message with that key
 - The receiver decrypts the message with his private key
 - Although, public key is public information, private key is secret but related to the public key in a special way

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Overview of Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC)

- Integer factorization problems (RSA)
- Discrete Logarithm problems (Diffie-Helman, ElGamal)
- Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems

Algorithm family	Bit length
Integer Factorization (IF)	1024
Discrete Logarithm (DL)	1024
Elliptic curves (EC)	160
Block cipher	80

Security levels of PKCs

PKC Standards

- **IEEE P1363:** Comprehensive standard of PKC. Collection of IF, DL and EC, in particular:
 - Key establishment algorithms
 - Key transport algorithms
 - Digital Signature algorithms
- PKCS (Public key cryptography standard) by RSA
 - PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard
 - PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman key agreement Standard
 - PKCS #13: Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standard

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PKC Standards

- ANSI Banking Standards (ANSI=American National Standards Institute)
 - Elliptic curve key agreement and transport protocols X9.63
 - Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) X9.62
 - Key management using Diffie-Hellman X9.42
 - Hash algorithms for RSA X9.32-2
 - RSA signature algorithm X9.31-1
 - $\ \ \, Hash \, algorithm \, for \, RSA \, \, X9.30\text{--}2$
- Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) X9.30-1
- US Government Standards
 - Entity authentication FIPS ????
 - Digital Signature Standard (DSA) FIPS 186
 - Secure hash standard (SHA-1) FIPS 180-1

The RSA cryptosystem

- > First published:
 - · Scientific American, Aug. 1977. (after some censorship entanglements)
- > Currently the "work horse" of Internet security:
 - · Most Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) products.
 - · SSL/TLS: Certificates and key-exchange.
 - · Secure e-mail: PGP, Outlook, ...

RSA

- Most popular PKC
- 1977 Invented at MIT by Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
- Based on Integer Factorization problem
- Each user has public and private key pair.
- Its patent expired in 2000.

RSA

- Choose: $p, q \in \text{positive distinct } large primes$
- *Compute:* $n = p \times q$
- $n = \text{encryption/decryption modulus} \rightarrow \text{computations in } Z_n$
- *Compute:* $\varphi(n) = (p 1)(q 1)$
- Choose randomly: $e \in Z_{\omega(n)}^*$
- $\rightarrow \gcd(\varphi(n),e)=1$, (e has an inverse mod $\varphi(n)$)
- Find $d = e^{-1} = ?? \mod \varphi(n)$
- Encryption: $c = x^e \mod n$ where x < n
- Decryption: $x = c^d \mod n$
- n,e are made public but p,q,d are secret

The RSA trapdoor 1-to-1 function

- > Parameters: N=pq. N ≈1024 bits. p,q ≈512 bits. e - encryption exponent. $gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$.
- > 1-to-1 function: $RSA(M) = M^e \pmod{N}$ where $M \in Z_N^*$
- > Trapdoor:

d - decryption exponent.

Where $e \cdot d = 1 \pmod{\phi(N)}$

Triversion:

 $RSA(M)^{d} = M^{ed} = M^{k\phi(N)+1} = M \pmod{N}$

> (n,e,t,ϵ) -RSA Assumption: For any t-time alg. A:

 $Pr\left[\begin{array}{c} A(N,e,x) = x^{1/e} \ (N) \end{array} \right] : \begin{array}{c} p,q \stackrel{e}{\leftarrow} n \text{-bit primes,} \\ \sum_{N \in \mathbb{N}^n} \frac{1}{n} = x^{1/e} \end{array} \right] < \epsilon$

Example: RSA encryption & decryption

Alice

(1) chooses p = 3, q = 11

(2) n = pq = 33

(3) $\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)=20$.

(4) Chooses e = 3; gcd(3,20)=1 (5) Computes $d \propto e^{-1} \mod \varphi(n)$

 $d \propto 7$

(6) Sends (e, n) to Alice

(1) Message: x = 4

(2) $y \equiv x^e \mod n \equiv 31$

(3) Sends y to Bob

(7) $x \equiv y^d \mod n \equiv 4$

Example: RSA digital signature

Alice

(1) chooses p = 3, q = 11

(2) n = pq = 33

(3) $\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)=20$.

(4) Chooses e = 3; gcd(3,20)=1

(5) Computes $d \propto e^{-1} \mod \varphi(n)$ $d \propto 7$

(6) Sends (e, n) to Alice

(1) Message to be signed: x = 4

(2) $y \equiv x^e \mod n \equiv 31$

(3) Sends x & y to Bob

(7) Compute $y^d \mod n \equiv 4$

(8) If $x \equiv y^d \mod n$ (signature verified)

RSA keys Example (simple)

• p = 11, $q = 5 \Rightarrow n = 55$

 $\varphi(n) = 10 \times 4 = 40$ $=2^3\times5$

an integer e can be used as an encryption exponent if and only if e is not divisible by 2, 5

• We do not need to factor $\varphi(n)$ to get e

• Just verify: $gcd(\varphi(n), e) = 1$ (Euclidean algorithm)

Assume: e = 7 (public key)

Extended Euclidean algorithm $\Rightarrow e^{-1} = ?? \mod 40$

Secret exponent key: 23

other pares: e=3, $e^{-1}=??$ e=13, $e^{-1}=??$ e=17, e=17, e^{-1} =?? e =9, e^{-1} =?? e =11, e^{-1} =?? e =19, e^{-1} = ??

 $Z_{40}^* = \{1,3,7,9,11,13,17,19,21,23,27,29,31,33,37,39\}$

 $e=3, e^{-1}=27$ $e=13, e^{-1}=37$ $e=e^{-1}=\{9, 11, 19, 21, 29, 31, 39\}$

 $e=17, e^{-1}=33$

RSA idea....Example

• p = 101, $q = 113 \rightarrow n = 11413$

• $\varphi(n) = 100 \times 112 = 11200 = 2^{6}5^{2}7$

• an integer e can be used as an encryption exponent if and only if e is not divisible by 2, 5 or 7

• We do not need to factor $\varphi(n)$ to get e

• Just verify: $gcd(\varphi(n), e) = 1$ (Euclidean algorithm)

• Assume: e = 3533 (public key)

• Extended Euclidean algorithm $\Rightarrow e^{-1} = 6597 \mod$

• Secret exponent key: 6597

Some notes about e, d, p, and q

- p and q must be large for security
- e, the encryption exponent, does not have to be that large $(2^{16} - 1 = 65535 \text{ is good})$
- d, the decryption exponent, needs to be sufficiently large (512 to 2048 bits)
- · Having to work with such large numbers, we need to look at some other elements of RSA.

RSA: Component Operations

- Factorization
- Believed to be difficult (security is here)
- Exponentiation
- We need to do it fast
- · Generating prime numbers Mersenne Primes
- Fermat Primes Testing primality
 - Fermat Test
 - Miller-Rabin test
- http://mathworld.wolfram.com/news/2002-08-07 primetest/

http://www.cse.iitk.ac.in/primality.pdf

Some Number Theory

Factorization

- Brute force is stupid and slow
 - d = 1,2,3,4,... Does d divide n?
 - Factoring n = pq. If p ≤ q, n ≥ p^2 , so \sqrt{n} ≥ p
 - d can go high as √n in worst case
 - For n ~ 10⁴⁰, 10²⁰ number of divisions
- Use structure of Z_n
 - p –1 method (not really used, but a good speedup)
 - Pollard's rho method
 - Quadratic sieve, Number Field Sieve (NFS)
 - Is there a better method out there?

Prime Numbers

- **prime number** p: p > 1 and divisible only by 1
- · composite number: integer not prime

Prime Number Theorem:

- # of primes in positive integer $x = x / \ln x$
- for $x=10^{10}$, # of primes = 434,294,481

Theorem: Every positive integer is a product of primes. This factorization is unique.

- If p is a prime and it divides a product of integers $a \cdot b$
- then either $p \mid a$ or $p \mid b$.

- Z_n is a ring for any positive integer n
- $b \in Z_n$
- When b^{-1} exist?
- b^{-1} exist if and only if gcd(b, n) = 1
- Z_n^* is a ring with elements relatively prime to n
- Z_n^* has all elements with *multiplicative inverses*
- $|Z_n^*| = order$ of $Z_n^* = number$ of elements
- Z_n^* is closed under multiplication
 - -x, $y \in Z_n^*$ (x, y are relatively prime to n)
 - x.y is relatively prime to n

Integers: $a > 0 \& p \in prime$

(i) (Fermat's little theorem) ~1600s

If
$$gcd(a, p) = 1$$
, then
 $a^p = a \pmod{p}$
 $a^{p-1} = 1 \pmod{p}$

(ii) (Euler's theorem) ~1700s

modulo p-1.

If $r = s \mod (p - 1)$, then $a^r = a^s \pmod p$ when working modulo a prime p, exponents can be reduced

If gcd(a, n)=1, then $a^{\varphi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$

where $\varphi(n)$ is defined as the number of integers $1 \le a \le n$ such that gcd(a,n)=1 and called as *Euler's* φ -function. $\Rightarrow \varphi(p)=(p-1)$

Division in Congruence Classes

Congruence Classes (analogy)

- Let a, b, and n be integers with $n \neq 0$. We say that
 - $\rightarrow a \equiv b \pmod{n}$ (a is congruent (equivalent) to b mod n)
 - \rightarrow if a- b is a multiple of (positive or negative) n.
 - \rightarrow Thus, $a = b + k \cdot n$ for some integer k (positive or negative)

Proposition: a, b, c, d, n integers with $n \neq 0$

 $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$ and $c \equiv d \pmod{n}$.

Then

- $\checkmark a + c \equiv b + d \pmod{n}$
- $\checkmark a c \equiv b d \pmod{n}$
- $\checkmark a \cdot c \equiv b \cdot d \pmod{n}$

We can divide by $a \pmod{n}$ when gcd(a, n)=1

- Example: Solve $2x + 7 \equiv 3 \pmod{17}$
- Example: Solve $5x + 6 \equiv 13 \pmod{15}$.

Proposition: Suppose gcd(a, n)=1.

- Let s and t be integers such that $a \cdot s + n \cdot t = 1$.
- Then $a \cdot s \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$
- s is called the multiplicative inverse of $a \pmod{n}$

Extended Euclidean algorithm is a fairly efficient method of computing multiplicative inverses in congruence classes.

principle

- $a, n, x, y \in \text{integers}$; $n \ge 1$ and gcd(a, n)=1.
- If $x \equiv y \pmod{\varphi(n)}$ then

 $a^x \equiv a^y \pmod{n}$.

• i.e., mod n, \Rightarrow mod $\varphi(n)$ in the exponent.

Proof: $x = y + \varphi(n) \cdot k$ from congruence relation.

- Then
- $a^x = a^{y+\varphi(n)k} \equiv a^y \cdot (a^{\varphi(n)})^k \equiv a^y \cdot (1)^k \equiv a^y \pmod{n}$

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Example

Example 1: $2^{10} = 1024 \equiv 1 \pmod{11}$

Example 2: Compute 2⁻¹ (mod 11).

• $2 \cdot 2^9 = 2^{10} \equiv 1 \pmod{11} => 2^{-1} \equiv 2^9 \pmod{11} \equiv 6 \pmod{11}$.

Example 3: $\varphi(10) = \varphi(2.5) = (2.1) \cdot (5.1) = 4$.

• {1, 3, 7, 9}

Example 4: Compute 2⁴³²¹⁰ (mod 101)

- We know $2^{100} \equiv 1 \pmod{101} =>$
- $2^{43210} = 2^{432 \times 100 + 10} = (2^{100})^{432} \cdot 2^{10} \equiv 2^{10} \pmod{101} \equiv 14 \pmod{(101)}$.

RSA idea....clarification

- $p, q \in \text{positive } distinct primes$
- $n = p \times q$
- uses computations in Z_n
- $\varphi(n) = (p 1)(q 1)$
- $ab \equiv 1 \mod \phi(n)$
- $ab = t \phi(n) + 1$
- $t \in integer > 0$
- x ∈ Z_n*
- $(x^b)^a \equiv x^{t \phi(n) + 1}$

 $\equiv (x^{\phi(n)})^t x \pmod{n}$ See: $x^{\varphi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$

- $\equiv 1^t x \pmod{n}$
- $\equiv x \pmod{n}$
- $(x^b)^a \equiv x \pmod{n}$

Modular Exponentiation

 $x^a \pmod{n}$

Example: $2^{1234} \mod 789$,

- Naïve method: raise 2 to 1234 and then take the modulus.
- Is it practical (possible)?
- Practical method:
- Use binary expansion of the exponent.
- $1234 = (10011010010)_2$

Modular exponentiation example

 $2^{1234} \mod 789$ and $1234 = (10011010010)_2$

- 1 x = 2
- 0 $x=2\cdot 2=4$
- x = 4.4 = 16
- $1 \quad x = 16.16 = 256 \text{ and } x = 256.2 = 512$
- $1 \quad x = 512.512 = 196 \text{ and } x = 196.2 = 392$
- $0 \quad x = 392 \cdot 392 = 598$
- $1 \quad x = 598.598 = 187 \text{ and } x = 187.2 = 374$
- $0 \quad x = 374 \cdot 374 = 223$
- $0 \quad x = 223 \cdot 223 = 22$
- $1 \quad x = 22 \cdot 22 = 484 \text{ and } x = 484 \cdot 2 = 179$
- 0 $x = 179 \cdot 179 = 481$

All operations are performed modulo 789

Idea Behind Fast Exponentiation

- a ^ 256 mod 7
 - Don't do (a*a*a...*a) 256 times and mod by 7
- (a * b) mod p = (a mod p * b mod p) mod p
 - Shortcut: Look at binary representation of 256
 - $256 = 2^8$, ((((((((a²) 2) 2) 2) 2) 2) 2) 2 and mod 7 each time you perform a square
 - - $\begin{array}{l} 25 = 11001 = 2^4 + 2^3 + 2^0 \\ a \wedge 25 \bmod n = (a * a^8 * a^{16}) \bmod n \\ = (a * (((a^2)^2)^2) * ((((a^2)^2)^2)^2)) \bmod n \end{array}$

 $(((((((a^2 \mod n)^*a) \mod n)^2 \mod n)^2 \mod n)^2 \mod n)^*$ a) mod n

Is RSA really secure??

- > RSA:
 - public key: **(N,e)** Encrypt: $C = M^e \pmod{N}$ • private key: **d** Decrypt: $C^d = M \pmod{N}$

 $(M \in Z_N^*)$


Can RSA be an insecure cryptosystem??? Many attacks exist. Using RSA: What can go wrong?
 Computing φ(n) is no easier than factoring n
 From n = pq and φ(n) = (p-1)(q-1), we obtain:

 p² - (n - φ(n) + 1)p + n = 0
 The roots of the above equation will be p and q

 If the decryption exponent, a is known, Bob needs to choose a new decryption exponent.

 That isn't enough! Bob must also choose a new modulus.


A simple attack on textbook RSA



- > Session-key K is 64 bits. View $K \in \{0,...,2^{64}\}$ Eavesdropper sees: $C = K^e \pmod{N}$.
- > Suppose $K = K_1 \cdot K_2$ where K_1 , $K_2 \cdot 2^{34}$. (prob. =20%) Then: $C/K_1^e = K_2^e \pmod{N}$
- > Build table: $C/1^e$, $C/2^e$, $C/3^e$, ..., $C/2^{34e}$. time: 2^{34} For $K_2 = 0$,..., 2^{34} test if K_2^e is in table. time: 2^{34} .34
- Attack time: ≈2⁴⁰ << 2⁶⁴

Common RSA encryption


- > Never use textbook RSA.
- > RSA in practice:



- > Main question:
 - · How should the preprocessing be done?
 - · Can we argue about security of resulting system?

Attack on PKCS1


- > Bleichenbacher 98. Chosen-ciphertext attack.
- > PKCS1 used in SSL:



- \Rightarrow attacker can test if 16 MSBs of plaintext = '02'.
- > Attack: to decrypt a given ciphertext C do:
 - Pick random $r \in Z_N$. Compute $C' = r^e \cdot C = (rM)^e$.
 - Send C' to web server and use response.

Chosen ciphertext security (CCS)

 No efficient attacker can win the following game: (with non-negligible advantage)



Attacker wins if b=b'

Is RSA a one-way permutation?

To invert the RSA one-way function (without d) attacker must compute:

M from $C = M^e \pmod{N}$.

- > How hard is computing e'th roots modulo N ??
- > Best known algorithm:
 - · Step 1: factor N. (hard)
 - Step 2: Find e'th roots modulo p and q. (easy)

Shortcuts?

- Must one factor N in order to compute e'th roots? Exists shortcut for breaking RSA without factoring?
- > To prove no shortcut exists show a reduction:
 - Efficient algorithm for e'th roots mod N
 ⇒ efficient algorithm for factoring N.
 - · Oldest problem in public key cryptography.
- > Evidence no reduction exists: (BV'98)
 - "Algebraic" reduction ⇒ factoring is easy.
 - · Unlike Diffie-Hellman (Maurer'94).

RSA With Low public exponent

- To speed up RSA encryption (and sig. verify) use a small e. C = M° (mod N)
- > Minimal value: e=3 ($gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$)
- Recommended value: e=65537=2¹⁶+1 Encryption: 17 mod. multiplies.
- > Several weak attacks. Non known on RSA-OAEP.
- > Asymmetry of RSA: fast enc. / slow dec.
 - ElGamal: approx. same time for both.

Implementation attacks

- \succ Attack the implementation of RSA.
- Timing attack: (Kocher 97) The time it takes to compute C^d (mod N) can expose d.
- Power attack: (Kocher 99)
 The power consumption of a sr

The power consumption of a smartcard while it is computing $C^d \pmod{N}$ can expose d.

> Faults attack: (BDL 97)

A computer error during $C^d \pmod{N}$

can expose d.

OpenSSL defense: check output. 5% slowdown.

DES vs. RSA

- RSA is about 1500 times slower than DES
 - Exponentiation and modulus
- Generation of numbers used in RSA can take time
- Test n against known methods of factoring
 - http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/challenges/factoring/numbers.html

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Key lengths

 Security of public key system should be comparable to security of block cipher.
 NIST:

 Cipher key-size
 Modulus size

 ≤ 64 bits
 512 bits.

 80 bits
 1024 bits

 128 bits
 3072 bits.

 256 bits (AES)
 15360 bits

➤ High security ⇒ very large moduli.
Not necessary with Elliptic Curve Cryptography.

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key length for secure RSA

- > key length for secure RSA transmission is typically 1024 bits. 512 bits is now no longer considered secure.
- For more security or if you are paranoid, use 2048 or even 4096
- With the faster computers available today, the time taken to encrypt and decrypt even with a 4096-bit modulus really isn't an issue
- In practice, it is still effectively impossible for you or I to crack a message encrypted with a 512-bit key.
- An organisation like the NSA who has the latest supercomputers can probably crack it by brute force in a reasonable time, if they choose to put their resources to work on it.
- . The longer your information is needed to be kept secure, the longer the key you should use.

Key Distribution

- Then hard problem for symmetric (secret) key ciphers
- Transmitting a private key on an insecure channel
 - Asymmetric system solves problem

p & q generation recommendation

- To generate the primes p and q, generate a random number of bit length b/2 where b is the required bit length of n;
- set the low bit (this ensures the number is odd) and set the *two* highest bits (this ensures that the high bit of n is also set);
- check if prime; if not, increment the number by two and check again. This is p.
 Repeat for q starting with an integer of length b-b/2.
- If p<q, swop p and q (this only matters if you intend using the CRT form of the private key).
- In the extremely unlikely event that p=q, check your random number generator.
- For greater security, instead of incrementing by 2, generate another random number each time.

e & d recommendation

- In practice, common choices for e are 3, 17 and 65537 (2^16+1).
- These are Fermat primes and are chosen because they make the modular exponentiation operation faster.
- Also, having chosen e, it is simpler to test whether gcd(e, p-1)=1 and gcd(e, q-1)=1 while generating and testing the primes.
- Values of p or q that fail this test can be rejected there and then.
- To compute the value for d, use the <code>Extended Euclidean Algorithm</code> to calculate d = e^1 mod phi (this is known as <code>modular inversion</code>).