RSA

and Number Theory

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What is public key cryptography? Why is there a need?

- Asymmetric vs. Symmetric
- Problems solved by public key
 - Shared secret not needed
 - Authentication
- Trapdoor one-way function
 - Factoring integers
 - Discrete logs
- Slow, power hungry

Public Key Cryptographic Use

- Secure RPC
- SSL
- Cisco encrypting routers

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Public Key Cryptosystem Security

- can never provide unconditional security
- Try all possible plaintexts since public key is known
- When you mach with the ciphertext → corresponding plaintext is known

Where did public key cryptography come from?


- Diffie and Hellman
 - Credited with invention (circa 1976)
 - One year later, RSA is invented
 - April 2002, ACM communications
- 1973 James Ellis (British Gov't)
 - "The possibility of non-secret encryption"
 - NSA claims

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Key distribution

- Alice and Bob need to talk
- Insecure channel of communication
- First, set up our field that our numbers will operate within:
 - p, a large prime (sets up something called our field)
 - $-\alpha$ is called a primitive root of Fp

Alice and Bob obtain a private key using public keys



So, $k_1 = k_o$, and a secret key is shared between Alice and Bob.

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What does the adversary know, and what can he do?

- Knows α^a , α^b , α , and p
- So we want to find the key, k
 - $k = \alpha^{ab}$
 - This is believed to be hard.
- If one knows how to compute discrete logs efficiently, then one can break this scheme (and other schemes based on public key cryptography)

trapdoor one-way function

- one-way function
 - easy to compute but hard to invert
 - Example:
 - *Given*: $31 = 2^b \mod 127$, *Find b*?? (DL problem)
- trapdoor function
 - Is one-way function but easy to invert with extra secret knowledge or private info
 (knowledge of a certain trapdoor)

Overview

- RSA
 - Rivest, Shamir, Adleman, 1977
- Z_n
 - Modular operations (the expensive part)
 - A sender looks up the public key of the receiver, and encrypts the message with that key
 - The receiver decrypts the message with his private key
 - Although, public key is public information, private key is secret but related to the public key in a special way

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Overview of Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC)

- Integer factorization problems (RSA)
- Discrete Logarithm problems (Diffie-Helman, ElGamal)
- Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems

| Algorithm family | Bit length |
|----------------------------|------------|
| Integer Factorization (IF) | 1024 |
| Discrete Logarithm (DL) | 1024 |
| Elliptic curves (EC) | 160 |
| Block cipher | 80 |

Security levels of PKCs

PKC Standards

- **IEEE P1363:** Comprehensive standard of PKC. Collection of IF, DL and EC, in particular:
 - Key establishment algorithms
 - Key transport algorithms
 - Digital Signature algorithms
- PKCS (Public key cryptography standard) by RSA
 - PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard
 - PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman key agreement Standard
 - PKCS #13: Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standard

PKC Standards

- ANSI Banking Standards (ANSI=American National Standards Institute)
 - Elliptic curve key agreement and transport protocols X9.63
 - Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) X9.62
 - Key management using Diffie-Hellman X9.42
 - Hash algorithms for RSA X9.32-2
 - RSA signature algorithm X9.31-1
 - Hash algorithm for RSA X9.30-2
 - Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) X9.30-1
- US Government Standards
 - Entity authentication FIPS ????
 - Digital Signature Standard (DSA) FIPS 186
 - Secure hash standard (SHA-1) FIPS 180-1

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The RSA cryptosystem

- > First published:
 - Scientific American, Aug. 1977.
 (after some censorship entanglements)
- > Currently the "work horse" of Internet security:
 - · Most Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) products.
 - · SSL/TLS: Certificates and key-exchange.
 - Secure e-mail: PGP, Outlook, ...

RSA

- Most popular PKC
- 1977 Invented at MIT by Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
- Based on Integer Factorization problem
- Each user has public and private key pair.
- Its patent expired in 2000.

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RSA

- Choose: $p, q \in \text{positive distinct } large primes$
- *Compute:* $n = p \times q$
- $n = \text{encryption/decryption modulus} \rightarrow \text{computations in } Z_n$
- *Compute:* $\varphi(n) = (p 1)(q 1)$
- Choose randomly: $e \in Z_{\varphi(n)}^*$
- $\rightarrow \gcd(\varphi(n),e)=1$, (e has an inverse mod $\varphi(n)$)
- Find $d = e^{-1} = ?? \mod \varphi(n)$
- *Encryption:* $c = x^e \mod n$ where x < n
- Decryption: $x = c^d \mod n$
- n,e are made public but p,q,d are secret

The RSA trapdoor 1-to-1 function

- > Parameters: $\begin{cases} N=pq. & N\approx 1024 \text{ bits.} & p,q\approx 512 \text{ bits.} \\ e-encryption exponent. & gcd(e, <math>\phi(N)$) = 1.
- > 1-to-1 function: RSA(M) = M^e (mod N) where $M \in Z_N^*$
- > Trapdoor: d decryption exponent.

Where $e \cdot d = 1 \pmod{\phi(N)}$

- > Inversion: $RSA(M)^d = M^{ed} = M^{k\phi(N)+1} = M \pmod{N}$
- > (n,e,t,ϵ) -RSA Assumption: For any t-time alg. A:

$$\text{Pr} \Big[\ \ \text{A(N,e,x)} = x^{1/e} \, (\text{N}) \ \ : \ \ \ \ \, \underset{N \leftarrow pq, \quad x \xleftarrow{R} Z_N^*}{\text{N-pq,}} \ \ \ \, \Big] < \epsilon$$

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Example: RSA encryption & decryption

Bob

Alice

- (1) chooses p = 3, q = 11
- (2) n = pq = 33
- (3) $\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)=20$.
- (4) Chooses e = 3; gcd(3,20)=1
- (5) Computes $d \propto e^{-1} \mod \varphi(n)$

 $d \propto 7$

- (6) Sends (e, n) to Alice
- (1) Message: x = 4
- $(2) y \equiv x^e \bmod n \equiv 31$
- (3) Sends y to Bob


 $(7) x \equiv y^d \bmod n \equiv 4$

Example: RSA digital signature

Bob

Alice

- (1) chooses p = 3, q = 11
- (2) n = pq = 33
- (3) $\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)=20$.
- (4) Chooses e = 3; gcd(3,20)=1
- (5) Computes $d \propto e^{-1} \mod \varphi(n)$ $d \propto 7$
- (6) Sends (e, n) to Alice



- (1) Message to be signed: x = 4
- (2) $y \equiv x^e \mod n \equiv 31$
- (3) Sends x & y to Bob
- (7) Compute $y^d \mod n \equiv 4$
- (8) If $x \equiv y^d \mod n$ (signature verified)

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RSA keys Example (simple)

- p = 11, $q = 5 \implies n = 55$
- $\varphi(n) = 10 \times 4 = 40 = 2^3 \times 5$
- an integer *e* can be used as an encryption exponent if and only if *e* is not divisible by 2, 5
- We do not need to factor $\varphi(n)$ to get e
- Just verify: $gcd(\varphi(n), e) = 1$ (Euclidean algorithm)
- *Assume:* e = 7 (public key)
- Extended Euclidean algorithm $\Rightarrow e^{-1} = ?? \mod 40$
- Secret exponent key: 23
- other pares: e=3, $e^{-1}=??$ e=9, $e^{-1}=??$ e=11, $e^{-1}=??$ e=13, $e^{-1}=??$ e=17, $e^{-1}=$?? e=19, $e^{-1}=$??
- $Z_{40}^* = \{1,3,7,9,11,13,17,19,21,23,27,29,31,33,37,39\}$
- e=3, $e^{-1}=27$ e=13, $e^{-1}=37$ e=17, $e^{-1}=33$ $e=e^{-1}=\{9, 11, 19, 21, 29, 31, 39\}$

RSA idea....Example

- p = 101, $q = 113 \rightarrow n = 11413$
- $\varphi(n) = 100 \times 112 = 11200 = 2^65^27$
- an integer *e* can be used as an encryption exponent if and only if *e* is not divisible by 2, 5 or 7
- We do not need to factor $\varphi(n)$ to get e
- Just verify: $gcd(\varphi(n), e) = 1$ (Euclidean algorithm)
- Assume: e = 3533 (public key)
- Extended Euclidean algorithm $\Rightarrow e^{-1} = 6597 \mod 11200$
- Secret exponent key: 6597

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Some notes about e, d, p, and q

- p and q must be large for security
- e, the encryption exponent, does not have to be that large $(2^{16} 1 = 65535)$ is good)
- d, the decryption exponent, needs to be sufficiently large (512 to 2048 bits)
- Having to work with such large numbers, we need to look at some other elements of RSA.

RSA: Component Operations

- Factorization
 - Believed to be difficult (security is here)
- Exponentiation
 - We need to do it fast
- Generating prime numbers
 - Mersenne Primes
 - Fermat Primes
- Testing primality
 - Fermat Test
 - Square Root test
 - Miller-Rabin test
- http://mathworld.wolfram.com/news/2002-08-07_primetest/
- http://www.cse.iitk.ac.in/primality.pdf

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Some Number Theory

Factorization

- Brute force is stupid and slow
 - d = 1,2,3,4,... Does d divide n?
 - Factoring n = pq. If $p \le q$, $n \ge p^2$, so $\sqrt{n} \ge p$
 - d can go high as √n in worst case
 - For n $\sim 10^{40}$, 10^{20} number of divisions
- Use structure of Z_n
 - p –1 method (not really used, but a good speedup)
 - Pollard's rho method
 - Quadratic sieve, Number Field Sieve (NFS)
 - Is there a better method out there?

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Prime Numbers

- **prime number** p: p > 1 and divisible only by 1
- composite number: integer not prime

Prime Number Theorem:

- # of primes in positive integer $x = x / \ln x$
- for $x=10^{10}$, # of primes = 434,294,481

Theorem: Every positive integer is a product of primes. This factorization is unique.

- If p is a prime and it divides a product of integers $a \cdot b$
- then either $p \mid a$ or $p \mid b$.

Z_n

- Z_n is a ring for any positive integer n
- $b \in Z_n$
- When b^{-1} exist?
- b^{-1} exist if and only if gcd(b, n) = 1
- Z_n^* is a ring with elements relatively prime to n
- Z_n^* has all elements with *multiplicative inverses*
- $|Z_n^*| = order$ of $Z_n^* = number$ of elements
- Z_n^* is closed under multiplication
 - -x, $y \in Z_n^*$ (x, y are relatively prime to n)
 - -x. y is relatively prime to n

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Integers: $a > 0 \& p \in prime$

(i) (Fermat's little theorem) ~1600s

If
$$gcd(a, p) = 1$$
, then
 $a^p = a \pmod{p}$
 $a^{p-1} = 1 \pmod{p}$

(*ii*) (*Euler's theorem*) ~1700s

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If r = s \mod (p - 1), then a^r = a^s \pmod p when working modulo a prime p, exponents can be reduced modulo p - 1.
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If gcd(a, n)=1, then $a^{\varphi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ where $\varphi(n)$ is defined as the number of integers $1 \le a \le n$ such that gcd(a, n)=1 and called as *Euler's* φ -function. $\Rightarrow \varphi(p)=(p-1)$

Congruence Classes (analogy)

- Let a, b, and n be integers with $n \neq 0$. We say that
 - $\rightarrow a \equiv b \pmod{n}$ (a is congruent (equivalent) to b mod n)
 - \rightarrow if a-b is a multiple of (positive or negative) n.
 - \rightarrow Thus, $a = b + k \cdot n$ for some integer k (positive or negative)

Proposition: a, b, c, d, n integers with $n \neq 0$ and

 $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$ and $c \equiv d \pmod{n}$.

Then

- $\checkmark a + c \equiv b + d \pmod{n}$
- $\checkmark a c \equiv b d \pmod{n}$
- $\checkmark a \cdot c \equiv b \cdot d \pmod{n}$

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Division in Congruence Classes

We can divide by $a \pmod{n}$ when gcd(a, n)=1

- Example: Solve $2x + 7 \equiv 3 \pmod{17}$
- Example: Solve $5x + 6 \equiv 13 \pmod{15}$.

Proposition: Suppose gcd(a, n)=1.

- Let s and t be integers such that $a \cdot s + n \cdot t = 1$.
- Then $a \cdot s \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$
- *s* is called *the multiplicative inverse of a* (mod *n*)

Extended Euclidean algorithm is a fairly efficient method of computing multiplicative inverses in congruence classes.

principle

- $a, n, x, y \in \text{integers}$; $n \ge 1$ and gcd(a, n)=1.
- If $x \equiv y \pmod{\varphi(n)}$ then

$$a^x \equiv a^y \pmod{n}$$
.

• i.e., mod n, \Rightarrow mod $\varphi(n)$ in the exponent.

Proof: $x = y + \varphi(n) \cdot k$ from congruence relation.

- Then
- $a^x = a^{y+\varphi(n)k} \equiv a^y \cdot (a^{\varphi(n)})^k \equiv a^y \cdot (1)^k \equiv a^y \pmod{n}$

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Example

Example 1: $2^{10} = 1024 \equiv 1 \pmod{11}$

Example 2: Compute 2⁻¹ (mod 11).

• $2 \cdot 2^9 = 2^{10} \equiv 1 \pmod{11} => 2^{-1} \equiv 2^9 \pmod{11} \equiv 6 \pmod{11}$.

Example 3: $\varphi(10) = \varphi(2.5) = (2.1) \cdot (5.1) = 4$.

• {1, 3, 7, 9}

Example 4: Compute 2⁴³²¹⁰ (mod 101)

- We know $2^{100} \equiv 1 \pmod{101} =>$
- $2^{43210} = 2^{432x100+10} = (2^{100})^{432} \cdot 2^{10} \equiv 2^{10} \pmod{101} \equiv 14 \pmod{(101)}$.

RSA idea....clarification

- $p, q \in \text{positive } distinct primes$
- $n = p \times q$
- uses computations in Z_n
- $\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$
- $ab \equiv 1 \mod \phi(n)$
- $ab = t \phi(n) + 1$
- $t \in integer > 0$
- $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$
- $(x^b)^a \equiv x^{t \phi(n) + 1}$
- $\equiv (x \, \phi(n))^t \, x \, (mod \, n)$ See: $x^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \, (mod \, n)$
- $\equiv 1^t x \pmod{n}$
- $\equiv x \pmod{n}$
- $(x^b)^a \equiv x \pmod{n}$

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Modular Exponentiation

 $x^a \pmod{n}$

Example: 2¹²³⁴ mod 789,

- *Naïve method:* raise 2 to 1234 and then take the modulus.
- Is it practical (possible)?
- Practical method:
- Use binary expansion of the exponent.
- $1234 = (10011010010)_2$

Modular exponentiation example

 $2^{1234} \mod 789$ and $1234 = (10011010010)_2$

- 1 x = 2
- $0 x = 2 \cdot 2 = 4$
- 0 x = 4.4 = 16
- $1 \quad x = 16.16 = 256 \text{ and } x = 256.2 = 512$
- $1 \quad x = 512.512 = 196 \text{ and } x = 196.2 = 392$
- $0 \quad x = 392 \cdot 392 = 598$
- $1 \quad x = 598.598 = 187 \text{ and } x = 187.2 = 374$
- $0 \quad x = 374 \cdot 374 = 223$
- $0 \quad x = 223.223 = 22$
- $1 \quad x = 22 \cdot 22 = 484 \text{ and } x = 484 \cdot 2 = 179$
- $0 \quad x = 179 \cdot 179 = 481$

All operations are performed modulo 789

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Idea Behind Fast Exponentiation

- a ^ 256 mod 7
 - Don't do (a*a*a...*a) 256 times and mod by 7
- (a * b) mod p = (a mod p * b mod p) mod p
 - Shortcut: Look at binary representation of 256
 - $256 = 2^8$, (((((((((a²) ²) ²) ²) ²) ²) ²) ²) ²) and mod 7 each time you perform a square
 - $25 = 11001 = 2^4 + 2^3 + 2^0$ $a \land 25 \mod n = (a * a^8 * a^{16}) \mod n$ $= (a * (((a^2)^2)^2) * ((((a^2)^2)^2)^2)) \mod n$ $(((((((a^2 \mod n)^*a) \mod n)^2 \mod n)^2 \mod n)^2 \mod n)^2 \mod n)^2$ $= (a * (((a^2)^2)^2) * ((((a^2)^2)^2)^2)) \mod n$

Is RSA really secure??

- > RSA:
 - public key: (N,e) Encrypt: $C = M^e \pmod{N}$
 - private key: **d** Decrypt: $C^d = M \pmod{N}$

 $(M \in Z_N^*)$


Can RSA be an insecure cryptosystem???Many attacks exist.

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Using RSA: What can go wrong?

- ullet Computing $\phi(n)$ is no easier than factoring n
- From n = pq and $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$, we obtain:
 - $-p^{2}-(n-\phi(n)+1)p+n=0$
 - The roots of the above equation will be p and q
- If the decryption exponent, a is known, Bob needs to choose a new decryption exponent.
 - That isn't enough! Bob must also choose a new modulus.

A simple attack on textbook RSA




- > Session-key K is 64 bits. View $K \in \{0,...,2^{64}\}$ Eavesdropper sees: $C = K^e \pmod{N}$.
- > Suppose $K = K_1 \cdot K_2$ where $K_1, K_2 \cdot 2^{34}$. (prob. ≈20%) Then: $C/K_1^e = K_2^e$ (mod N)
- > Build table: $C/1^e$, $C/2^e$, $C/3^e$, ..., $C/2^{34e}$. time: 2^{34} For $K_2 = 0$,..., 2^{34} test if K_2^e is in table. time: $2^{34} \cdot 34$
- > Attack time: $\approx 2^{40} \ll 2^{64}$

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Common RSA encryption

- > Never use textbook RSA.
- > RSA in practice:




- > Main question:
 - · How should the preprocessing be done?
 - · Can we argue about security of resulting system?

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Attack on PKCS1

- > Bleichenbacher 98. Chosen-ciphertext attack.
- > PKCS1 used in SSL:




- \Rightarrow attacker can test if 16 MSBs of plaintext = '02'.
- > Attack: to decrypt a given ciphertext C do:
 - Pick random $r \in Z_N$. Compute $C' = r^e \cdot C = (rM)^e$.
 - Send C' to web server and use response.

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Chosen ciphertext security (CCS)

No efficient attacker can win the following game: (with non-negligible advantage)



Attacker wins if b=b'

Is RSA a one-way permutation?

> To invert the RSA one-way function (without d) attacker must compute:

```
M from C = M^e \pmod{N}.
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- > How hard is computing e'th roots modulo N??
- > Best known algorithm:
 - Step 1: factor N. (hard)
 - Step 2: Find e'th roots modulo p and q. (easy)

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Shortcuts?

- Must one factor N in order to compute e'th roots?
 Exists shortcut for breaking RSA without factoring?
- > To prove no shortcut exists show a reduction:
 - · Efficient algorithm for e'th roots mod N
 - \Rightarrow efficient algorithm for factoring N.
 - · Oldest problem in public key cryptography.
- > Evidence no reduction exists: (BV'98)
 - "Algebraic" reduction ⇒ factoring is easy.
 - · Unlike Diffie-Hellman (Maurer'94).

RSA With Low public exponent

- > To speed up RSA encryption (and sig. verify) use a small e. $C = M^e \pmod{N}$
- > Minimal value: e=3 ($gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$)
- Recommended value: e=65537=2¹⁶+1
 Encryption: 17 mod. multiplies.
- > Several weak attacks. Non known on RSA-OAEP.
- > Asymmetry of RSA: fast enc. / slow dec.
 - ElGamal: approx. same time for both.

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Implementation attacks

- > Attack the implementation of RSA.
- Timing attack: (Kocher 97)

 The time it takes to compute C^d (mod N)

 can expose d.
- Power attack: (Kocher 99)

 The power consumption of a smartcard while it is computing C^d (mod N) can expose d.
- Faults attack: (BDL 97)

 A computer error during C^d (mod N)

 can expose d.

 OpenSSL defense: check output. 5% slowdown.

DES vs. RSA

- RSA is about 1500 times slower than DES
 - Exponentiation and modulus
- Generation of numbers used in RSA can take time
- Test n against known methods of factoring
 - http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/challenges/factoring/numbers.html

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Key lengths

> Security of public key system should be comparable to security of block cipher.

NIST:

| <u>Cipher key-size</u> | <u>Modulus size</u> |
|------------------------|---------------------------|
| ≤ 64 bits | 512 bits. |
| 80 bits | 1024 bits |
| 128 bits | 3072 bits. |
| 256 bits (AES) | <u> 15360</u> bits |

High security ⇒ very large moduli.
 Not necessary with Elliptic Curve Cryptography.

key length for secure RSA

- > key length for secure RSA transmission is typically 1024 bits. 512 bits is now no longer considered secure.
- > For more security or if you are paranoid, use 2048 or even 4096
- With the faster computers available today, the time taken to encrypt and decrypt even with a 4096-bit modulus really isn't an issue anymore.
- > In practice, it is still effectively impossible for you or I to crack a message encrypted with a 512-bit key.
- > An organisation like the NSA who has the latest supercomputers can probably crack it by brute force in a reasonable time, if they choose to put their resources to work on it.
- > The longer your information is needed to be kept secure, the longer the key you should use.

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Key Distribution

- Then hard problem for symmetric (secret) key ciphers
- Transmitting a private key on an insecure channel
 - Asymmetric system solves problem

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p & q generation recommendation

- To generate the primes p and q, generate a random number of bit length b/2 where b is the required bit length of n;
- set the low bit (this ensures the number is odd) and set the *two* highest bits (this ensures that the high bit of n is also set);
- check if prime; if not, increment the number by two and check again. This is p.
- Repeat for q starting with an integer of length b-b/2.
- If p<q, swop p and q (this only matters if you intend using the CRT form of the private key).
- In the extremely unlikely event that p = q, check your random number generator.
- For greater security, instead of incrementing by 2, generate another random number each time.

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e & d recommendation

- In practice, common choices for e are 3, 17 and 65537 (2^16+1).
- These are Fermat primes and are chosen because they make the modular exponentiation operation faster.
- Also, having chosen e, it is simpler to test whether gcd(e, p-1)=1 and gcd(e, q-1)=1 while generating and testing the primes.
- Values of p or q that fail this test can be rejected there and then.
- To compute the value for d, use the *Extended Euclidean Algorithm* to calculate d = e^-1 mod phi (this is known as *modular inversion*).